Scott Priest

I’ve read a lot of articles talking about what the Red Sox should do with their offseason, and they all seem to lead to the same conclusions: Find a way to replace David Ortiz’s bat, add a couple of relievers and maybe an extra starter, and then roll out last year’s roster otherwise untouched.

I understand the logic behind this theory, and it even seems like Red Sox management agrees. Dave Dombrowski has indicated that big moves like last year’s acquisitions of David Price and Craig Kimbrel are unlikely, and with the bulk of Boston’s team young and on the rise (or in their prime), a complete overhaul would seem unnecessary. And that’s not even factoring in the massive changes made to the front office.

Replacing Ortiz’s bat comes down to three ideas: Sign Edwin Encarnacion for big money, sign a player like Jose Bautista or Carlos Beltran for a shorter commitment, or turn DH into a revolving door of bats young and old. Adding a starter will depend on the health and perceived dependability of the back end of the rotation. These decisions are fairly direct and relatively isolated.

The bullpen is what I find most interesting, and is the one piece of this equation that I think would be interesting for the Red Sox to explore in an unorthodox way. 2016 — and particularly the 2016 playoffs — put the importance of good bullpens front and center. This suggests that the cream of the crop will be far outpacing the deals they got in the past — even Andrew Miller’s $36 million deal a few years ago will look like a bargain.

When Greg Holland — who missed all of last year while injured and underperformed in 2015 — is expected to get $10 million-$20 million per season, you know a market is out of control. While managers (and teams at large) appear to be understanding the concept of leverage and how relievers can be used optimally, I have trouble believing that throughout the course of a major-league season relievers will return the value of more outsized investments. For one thing, if relievers are consistently used in high-leverage situations their stats (and confidence) are going to take a beating: Do not underestimate the effects of psychology on pitching. And then there’s the issue of predictability. Relief pitchers are known for streaky performances and are, generally speaking, risky acquisitions.

So rather than jump head-first into the competition for bullpen arms that range from mediocre to (at best) high-risk, why not go the other way? Dombrowski should at least explore the trade market for any of his arms — Carson Smith, Heath Hembree, Matt Barnes, Joe Kelly, and, yes, even Craig Kimbrel. As teams keep bidding for the available free agents, some may realize they will be priced out and look to the trade market instead. It may be more economical to cash in relievers currently on the roster for prospects or other assets and then piece together a bullpen comprised of young, cost-controlled pitchers coming up from the minors, or less costly but potentially salvageable relievers with no closing experience (whose values are thus less likely to be inflated).

The biggest stumbling block to this recommendation — other than the admittedly generic nature of it — is that Dombrowski is well-known for being weak at bullpen-building in his career. Do we trust him to make these decisions? I’m hesitant, but I’d still rather see him zag if zigging means eight figures over multiple years for the likes of Holland or shelling out $100 million for Aroldis Chapman. Last year Dombrowski declared his goals and systematically checked them off; hopefully this year he will at least explore the values of different types of players on the market and be flexible to take advantage of them.

It’s opening day for the Red Sox, who after winning the offseason are sure to sputter to a .500-ish season, fail to move any of their bad contracts, and probably fire John Farrell.

So rather than look forward to 2016, let’s instead celebrate the greatest swing all time:

While we’re here: Nationals over the Rangers for the World Series.

The Red Sox traded a gaggle of prospects for Padres closer Craig Kimbrel last week, and the reactions from baseball and the fan base (at least, the part of the fan base that is able to extract itself from 24/7 Patriots obsession) are in. MLB Trade Rumors collected some of those here and here, but they can be summed up in three categories:

1. This deal is Dave Dombrowski incarnate and represents a big departure from the Red Sox’ past philosophy.
2. They overpaid in prospects.
3. They needed to make a win-now move to sell tickets and boost NESN ratings.

Points two and three are not ones that I necessarily disagree with, although I can’t pretend to know much about the prospects dealt, in particular the bottom two. I know my first reaction upon being texted about the deal was, “Margot? NOOOOOOOOOOO,” but it was just a name I knew and not a particular skillset or projection that I liked.

Point one seems to be the most widely held reaction to the deal, but the one that I think, while it tells a nice narrative, is flawed.

Sure, Dombrowski has a history of making win-now moves; he also has worked for organizations with win-now imperatives — the Tigers under an aging Mike Ilitch, and the Marlins constant yo-yoing over whether they feel like winning.

Meanwhile, this doesn’t strike me as a panic move or a departure from traditional Red Sox thinking. Relief pitching is one of the Sox’ weak spots: Koji Uehara and Junichi Tazawa are aging and declining, and there’s no one else to get too excited about, unless you’re still a big believer in Matt Barnes. The Royals just showed how important a dominant bullpen can be, so this seems to be a sensible step toward bringing the Sox up to speed in that department.

Kimbrel is in his prime and under team control for three years at his market value, or maybe even a little lower than that. His traditional numbers dipped last year, but statistical analyses have shown that he appeared in extremely difficult situations and was still among the best in the game at what he does. The Sox used similar reasoning in their (horrible) moves to sign Hanley Ramirez and Pablo Sandoval last year, being more enamored of both players because they could be signed at younger ages or for fewer years — and thus theoretically closer to their primes — than other big free agents.

And this Fangraphs assessment finds that the Sox paid in trade assets what would be considered market value, suggesting that they didn’t just panic and push chips to the center of the table.

Add all this up and to me it sounds like they reviewed their weaknesses, targeted a specific cost-effective, in-his-prime player to fill that void, and then carefully calculated what his value should be in terms of prospects and dollars. And if it helps sell a couple tickets, all the better.

So is Dave Dombrowski really all that different from Ben Cherington?