I’ve read a lot of articles talking about what the Red Sox should do with their offseason, and they all seem to lead to the same conclusions: Find a way to replace David Ortiz’s bat, add a couple of relievers and maybe an extra starter, and then roll out last year’s roster otherwise untouched.

I understand the logic behind this theory, and it even seems like Red Sox management agrees. Dave Dombrowski has indicated that big moves like last year’s acquisitions of David Price and Craig Kimbrel are unlikely, and with the bulk of Boston’s team young and on the rise (or in their prime), a complete overhaul would seem unnecessary. And that’s not even factoring in the massive changes made to the front office.

Replacing Ortiz’s bat comes down to three ideas: Sign Edwin Encarnacion for big money, sign a player like Jose Bautista or Carlos Beltran for a shorter commitment, or turn DH into a revolving door of bats young and old. Adding a starter will depend on the health and perceived dependability of the back end of the rotation. These decisions are fairly direct and relatively isolated.

The bullpen is what I find most interesting, and is the one piece of this equation that I think would be interesting for the Red Sox to explore in an unorthodox way. 2016 — and particularly the 2016 playoffs — put the importance of good bullpens front and center. This suggests that the cream of the crop will be far outpacing the deals they got in the past — even Andrew Miller’s $36 million deal a few years ago will look like a bargain.

When Greg Holland — who missed all of last year while injured and underperformed in 2015 — is expected to get $10 million-$20 million per season, you know a market is out of control. While managers (and teams at large) appear to be understanding the concept of leverage and how relievers can be used optimally, I have trouble believing that throughout the course of a major-league season relievers will return the value of more outsized investments. For one thing, if relievers are consistently used in high-leverage situations their stats (and confidence) are going to take a beating: Do not underestimate the effects of psychology on pitching. And then there’s the issue of predictability. Relief pitchers are known for streaky performances and are, generally speaking, risky acquisitions.

So rather than jump head-first into the competition for bullpen arms that range from mediocre to (at best) high-risk, why not go the other way? Dombrowski should at least explore the trade market for any of his arms — Carson Smith, Heath Hembree, Matt Barnes, Joe Kelly, and, yes, even Craig Kimbrel. As teams keep bidding for the available free agents, some may realize they will be priced out and look to the trade market instead. It may be more economical to cash in relievers currently on the roster for prospects or other assets and then piece together a bullpen comprised of young, cost-controlled pitchers coming up from the minors, or less costly but potentially salvageable relievers with no closing experience (whose values are thus less likely to be inflated).

The biggest stumbling block to this recommendation — other than the admittedly generic nature of it — is that Dombrowski is well-known for being weak at bullpen-building in his career. Do we trust him to make these decisions? I’m hesitant, but I’d still rather see him zag if zigging means eight figures over multiple years for the likes of Holland or shelling out $100 million for Aroldis Chapman. Last year Dombrowski declared his goals and systematically checked them off; hopefully this year he will at least explore the values of different types of players on the market and be flexible to take advantage of them.